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REPLY TO BECKER AND FUEST
James R. Hines Jr.
It is an understatement to say that the appropriate taxation of foreign business income is a controversial and potentially confusing topic. One of the mysteries of interna-
tional taxation has been that the prescriptions of what, until recently, was the accepted 
academic wisdom differs so sharply from widespread international practice. In an 
important contribution, Richman (1963) noted that a home government confronted with 
the choice of where it would prefer one of its resident taxpayers to allocate a single 
unit of capital would weigh the after-foreign-tax return from investing abroad against 
the pre-tax return from investing at home. From this observation, she concluded that 
countries maximize their own welfare by subjecting foreign income to full current 
domestic taxation, permitting only a deduction for foreign tax payments. This analysis 
further implies that a policy of taxing foreign income while granting credits for foreign 
income tax payments maximizes world welfare.
In fact virtually no countries have policies that resemble those that this framework 
describes as optimal and therefore individually rational. Not only do most countries 
exempt active foreign business income from taxation, but the small number that do 
not nevertheless permit taxpayers to claim credits against domestic tax liability for 
foreign tax payments and do not tax foreign source income currently but only when 
it is repatriated to the domestic parent company. Hence international practice is to tax 
foreign income much less heavily than these theories imply that countries should ever 
want to do. This difference suggests either that governments systematically — and 
universally — err in their taxation of foreign income, or else that these older welfare 
frameworks fail to capture important aspects of the problem of taxing foreign source 
income.
More recent analysis of international tax norms challenges the older academic para-
digms by calling attention to the importance of tax-induced ownership patterns. Desai 
and Hines (2003, 2004), Devereux (2008), and others note that the general equilibrium 
impact of taxation on asset ownership — the reallocation of business ownership to tax-
preferred owners — and the role of ownership in infl uencing productivity together carry 
very different implications for national tax policies. In a world characterized by shifting 
ownership of business assets, countries maximize their own welfares by exempting 
active foreign business income from domestic taxation, and maximize world welfare by 
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conforming their taxation of foreign income to world norms. The purpose of the paper 
by Hines (2008) is to call attention to another tax policy implication of this ownership 
framework for analyzing international taxation, which is that the same considerations 
apply to domestic expense deductions that generate foreign income; specifi cally, coun-
tries maximize their own welfares by permitting full deduction of domestic expenses, 
and maximize world welfare by conforming their deductions to world norms.
The spirited comment by Becker and Fuest (2010) helps to illustrate the basis of these 
fi ndings. The welfare function used in the fi rst part of the comment is fundamentally 
partial equilibrium in nature, in that it does not incorporate the welfare effects of any 
additional domestic investment from foreigners (and domestic residents!) that would 
be associated with greater outbound foreign investment. This is refl ected in the home 
government maximizing the sum of domestic tax revenue and fi rm profi ts, but failing 
to incorporate tax revenue from foreign investors (and new domestic investors) in the 
domestic economy. This is the same government objective function used in the origi-
nal Richman (1963) framework, and as a result, it is not surprising that the comment 
draws conclusions (captured in Propositions 1 and 2) that are similar in spirit to those 
of Richman.
The point of the Hines (2008) paper was to consider a home country that optimally 
taxes foreign source income, and evaluate the accompanying optimal tax treatment of 
domestic expenses that contribute to the production of foreign source income. It is not 
possible to perform this exercise using a framework in which the home country taxation 
of foreign source income is not optimal. In the partial equilibrium approach used in the 
fi rst part of the Becker and Fuest (2010) comment, and refl ected in Propositions 1 and 
2, it is not optimal to exempt foreign income from domestic taxation; this is, indeed, the 
standard Richman (1963) result. The Becker and Fuest (2010) comment shows that if, 
in this setting, the home country nevertheless exempts foreign income from taxation, 
then it should not permit a deduction for domestic expenses that contribute to foreign 
income production. This analysis is correct, but it does not address the point of the Hines 
(2008) paper, which is to consider a situation in which governments have chosen their 
taxation of foreign income optimally.
It would be fair to say that the modeling framework used in Hines (2008) is anything 
but transparent in its treatment of the reasons underlying the optimality of exempting 
foreign income from taxation; for example, capital investment and labor inputs do not 
appear as arguments of the fi rm’s production function, instead being implicit — and the 
actions of foreign investors are not modeled at all. This might be justifi ed on the basis 
of simplicity, but it carries with it the possibility of engendering confusion. In order to 
evaluate whether, with a given government objective function, it is optimal to exempt 
foreign income from taxation, it is necessary to consider a model that explicitly includes 
capital as an argument of the production function; the need to do this is obscured by 
the omission of capital from the production functions in Hines (2008). When capital is 
explicitly included as an argument of fi rm production functions, it becomes clear that 
exempting foreign income from home country taxation is not optimal in the setting 
analyzed in the fi rst part of the Becker and Fuest (2010) comment. 
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Similarly including capital as an explicit argument of fi rm production functions 
in equation (9) of Hines (2008) produces the implication that home country welfare 
is maximized by exempting foreign income from taxation. The reason, therefore, to 
adopt equation (9) as the government’s maximand is that it captures other features of 
the economic setting that must hold in order for exemption to be optimal — presum-
ably, as other papers in the literature have analyzed, the impact of shifting ownership. 
Equation (9) refl ects that additional foreign income production by home country fi rms 
is associated with greater home country income production by foreign investors of a 
roughly equivalent amount, who respond to greater outbound investment by home 
country fi rms by increasing their investment in the home country. Equation (9) omits 
explicit consideration of foreign fi rms, but includes them implicitly by dividing the 
foreign profi ts of home country fi rms by (1 – τ) in recognition of the tax revenue that 
the home government will collect from foreign fi rms whose operations in the home 
country are (increasing) functions of the level of foreign activity by home country fi rms.
The second part of the Becker and Fuest (2010) comment very generously explores 
the possibility that the results reported in Hines (2008) could be obtained in an alter-
native partial equilibrium model in which home country fi rms have the ability to sell 
their foreign affi liates to unrelated foreigners. In this model foreigners appear for the 
fi rst time, as potential acquirers of domestically owned foreign affi liates, though not as 
investors in the home economy. As the comment reports in its Propositions 3 and 4, the 
model implies that fi rms should not be permitted to deduct all of their domestic expenses 
incurred in the production of foreign income. Again, this should not be surprising. The 
setting in this part of the paper does not incorporate the domestic effects of greater 
foreign investment, and as a result, a true exemption system is not optimal, refl ecting 
the fact that the model fails to capture all of the benefi ts of additional foreign income.
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